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"TO SAY THE GREATEST MATTERS IN THE SIMPLEST
WAY"': A "FIRST ECONOMIC INJURY" RULE AS A
RESTATEMENT OF DIRECTNESS STANDING
REQUIREMENTS IN FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
Christopher B. Durbin
Abstract: In addition to traditional constitutional standing analysis, federal antitrust law

examines a potential plaintiff's claims under a series of specialized standing requirements.
One of these requirements is that the plaintiff's injury be a "direct" result of the antitrust
violator's misconduct. This requirement has been prominent in recent tobacco litigation where
union health care trust funds sued the major tobacco companies in antitrust to recover the
costs of treating nicotine-addicted beneficiaries. Federal courts generally denied standing to
the trust funds for several reasons, one of which was the trust funds' failure to satisfy the
directness requirements. This Comment analyzes the tests that the U.S. Supreme Court has
used to determine whether a plaintiff's injuries are sufficiently direct to grant antitrust
standing. It argues that these tests-the direct purchaser rule, the cost-plus contract exception,
and the direct injury requirement-should be consolidated and restated as a "first economic
injury" rule, under which standing is awarded, assuming other standing requirements are met,
to the party that suffers the first economic impacts of the antitrust violation. This Comment
concludes that although the courts may have properly denied standing to the trust funds for
other reasons, the courts erred in declaring that the trust funds failed to satisfy any directness
requirement

"What is significantis not the tyranny of labels-directvs. indirect
purchaser, cost-plus vs. fixed-price contracts-but who has been
directly damaged by the [antitrustviolation]."
Standing is usually a topic reserved for law school classes on
constitutional law and other academic discussions. Occasionally,
however, it arises as a central issue in cases of "enormous public interest
and concern, in which great wrongs are alleged."3 Since the early 1990s,
private entities in increasing numbers have sued the major American
tobacco companies in attempts to recoup the tremendous financial costs
of smoking-related diseases.4 Among these private entities are union
health care trust funds, several classes of which have recently brought
antitrust claims against the tobacco companies.5 Despite the social and
1. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Beauty, in 6 The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson 279, 294
(1904).
2 Illinois v. Borg, 548 F. Supp. 972, 975 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
3. Service Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d
70,80 (D.D.C. 1999).
4. See infra note 117.
5. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 75:549, 2000

political significance of these cases, the large investments of time and
money by the parties, and the potential impact on other industries, these
class actions turned largely on the underdeveloped and inconsistently
applied doctrine of antitrust standing.6
Although standing in federal courts is always subject to traditional
constitutional analysis,7 antitrust law contains its own specific standing
requirements. In its attempts to limit lucrative treble-damage actions
under federal antitrust laws,8 the U.S. Supreme Court has announced
different tests9 and policy considerations 0 for granting standing to
private plaintiffs. Interpreting antitrust statutes that seemingly permit
anyone injured to sue," the Court has mandated, among other
conditions, 2 that the plaintiff demonstrate that its injuries were
proximately caused by the defendants' actions. 3 To establish proximate
cause the plaintiff must demonstrate a "direct" connection between the
antitrust violation and its injuries.
The Court has developed three particular manifestations of this
directness requirement: the direct purchaser rule, 4 the cost-plus contract
exception, 5 and the direct injury requirement. 6 It is difficult to decipher
the meaning of these requirements outside the specific factual contexts of
particular cases. Accordingly, in an atmosphere of uncertainty generated

6. See infra notes 124-28.
7. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994); infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 61-63.
10. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. This Comment will address standing only for
private antitrust plaintiffs seeking damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Public suits under the
Sherman Act (parenspatriaeactions) are governed by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15c
(1994) (suits by state attorneys general) and 15 U.S.C. § 15f(1994) (suits by U.S. Attorney General).
Private suits seeking only injunctive relief are addressed in 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1994). Section I of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), outlines substantive antitrust law and provides that "every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal."
12. The Court looks to other standing requirements in addition to proximate cause tests. See infra
note 106.
13. This proximate cause analysis is only one of several tests that the Supreme Court generally
applies in private antitrust actions. See Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531-33 (1983); see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 337-40 (1979) (injury to business or property requirement); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo BowlO-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (antitrust injury requirement).
14. See generallyIllinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); infra Part I.A.
15. See generallyIllinois Brick, 431 U.S. 720; infra Part I.B.
16. See Associated GeneralContractors,459 U.S. 519; infra Part I.C.

First Economic Injury Rule

by the Court's refusal to offer more concrete guidance, 7 the federal
courts have been unable to apply consistently the Court's precedents and
policies when faced with novel factual situations.
An analysis of the causal chains' 8 and actual grants of standing in
several prominent antitrust cases reveals an overriding theme in federal
antitrust jurisprudence: courts consistently grant standing to the party
that suffers the first economic impact of an antitrust violation. 9 This
common theme, better expressed as a "first economic injury" rule, does
not require that the plaintiff occupy any particular position in the causal
chain or be in privity ° with the antitrust violator and operates regardless
of whether the plaintiff subsequently "passes on' the costs of the
antitrust violation.
Part I of this Comment examines the most influential U.S. Supreme
Court and lower federal court precedents addressing directness as a
requirement for antitrust standing, as well as the tests and policies they
purport to administer in adjudging directness. Part II summarizes the
holdings in recent litigation against the tobacco companies in which
courts attempted to apply particular directness requirements in denying
antitrust standing to classes of union health care trust funds. Part III
explains the common theme of the U.S. Supreme Court's antitrust
directness jurisprudence and proposes that the various directness tests
applied by the Court be recast as a first economic injury rule. Part IV
argues that the trust fund courts' rulings diverged from applicable U.S.
Supreme Court precedent and contravened the proper application of the
first economic injury rule.'

17. See, e.g., Associated General Contractors,459 U.S. at 536 n.33 ("[C]ourts should analyze
each situation in light of the factors set forth... !).
18. This Comment uses the phrase "causal chain" to mean the causal connection between parties

economically affected by an antitrust violation.
19. See infraPart IlL
20. This Comment uses the term "privity" to mean an actual contractual relationship with the
antitrust violator, rather than a more distant interest in the violator's misconduct. Cf Black's Law
Dictionary 1217-18 (7th ed. 1999) (defining privity as the "relationship between the parties to a
contract").
21. See infra note 34.
22. In January 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to the plaintiffs in three of the trust

fund cases. See inffra note 117. Supreme Court Rule 10(a) indicates that disagreement among the
circuits weighs in favor of granting certiorari. In these cases, the Court's denial may have been

inspired in part by the circuit courts' unanimous rejection of the trust funds' arguments. It is not
clear how the U.S. Supreme Court may have ruled on specific standing issues in the trust fund cases.
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PRIVATE ANTITRUST STANDING REQUIREMENTS

A plaintiff's right to sue for damages in federal courts is governed at
the threshold by Article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which
states that federal courts may hear only "Cases" or "Controversies. '
That broad dictate is refined by a judicially developed standing
requirement, under which the plaintiff must demonstrate "personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly
unlawful conduct and likely
24
to be redressed by the requested relief.
In addition to universally applicable Article III requirements, federal
antitrust law imposes its own limits on who may sue.2 Section 4 of the
Clayton Act,26 which forms the starting point for private antitrust
standing analysis, provides that "any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws

may sue therefor.' '27 Of the U.S. Supreme Court's various tests and
policies limiting antitrust standing beyond the text of section 4,28 one is
the notion that a plaintiff's injury must be the direct result of an antitrust
violation.29 This directness requirement has manifested in three related
U.S. Supreme Court doctrines: the direct purchaser rule, the cost-plus
contract exception, and the direct injury test. The Court has traditionally

23. U.S. Const. art. 1II, § 2.
24. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
25. See Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 535 n.31 (1983) ("Harm to the antitrust plaintiff is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional
standing requirement of injury in fact, but the court must make a further determination whether the
plaintiff is a proper party to bring a private antitrust action.").
26. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 15. This facially broad language represents only the starting point for antitrust
standing analysis of private plaintiffs. See supra note 11.
28. This Comment will address only the principles related to directness. Several other
independent standing requirements also apply in private antitrust actions. See infra note 106 and
accompanying text.
29. Although the most prominent cases discussing directness standing requirements in antitrust
are relatively recent, the Court has long sought to limit damages to injuries proximately caused by
the antitrust violator's conduct. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Damell-Tanzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531,
533 (1918) ("The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the
first step."); see also Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (denying
stockholder standing for antitrust action because damages were "indirect, remote, and
consequential"). But cf Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1946) ("The
constant tendency of the courts is to find some way in which damages can be awarded where a
wrong has been done.") (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S.
555, 565 (1931)).

First Economic Injury Rule

looked to the facts of each case when determining which of these
directness tests it must apply.30
A.

The DirectPurchaserRule
Over the last thirty years, courts addressing price-fixing allegations 3

have applied a type of directness requirement known as the "direct33
' The rule addresses the phenomenon of intermediaries
purchaser rule."32
"passing on"'34 an antitrust overcharge35 through the chain of commerce
and limits treble-damage remedies to those parties that dealt directly with
the antitrust violator. The "pass on" theory arises in two particular

contexts.36 "Offensive" passing on is a plaintiff's attempt to establish
standing by demonstrating an injury passed through an intermediary.3 7

"Defensive" passing on is a defendant's attempt to deny standing by
demonstrating that the plaintiff escaped injury by passing on all
damages. 8

30. See AssociatedGeneralContractors,459 U.S. at 534-37.
31. See 2 Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 254-55 (rev. ed. 1995).
32. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
33. This Comment uses the term "intermediary" to mean any party that deals directly with an
antitrust violator (usually a contractual relationship) and subsequently passes on the effects of the
antitrust violation to another party. In this context, a "direct purchaser' is usually an intermediary
that purchases goods directly from the antitrust violator, while an "indirect purchaser" subsequently
purchases the goods from the intermediary-thus dealing with the antitrust violator only
"indirectly." Cf Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirectpurchaserruleand Cost-PlusSales, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 1717, 1717 n.5 (1990).
34. See Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 31, at 255-56; Hovenkamp, supra note 33, at 1717;
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect PurchasersHavd Standing to Sue Under
the AntitrustLaws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 602, 602
(1979); Cynthia Urda Kassis, Comment, The Indirect Purchaser'sRight to Sue Under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act: Another CongressionalResponse to Illinois Brick, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 1087, 1088
(1983). For a more thorough economic analysis of the pass-on theory than is possible in the context
of this Comment, see generally Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, PassingOn the Monopoly
Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 269 (1979); and Edmund H.
Mantell, Denial of a Forum to Indirect-PurchaserVictims of Price Fixing Conspiracies: A Legal
andEconomic Analysis of Illinois Brick, 2 Pace L. Rev. 153 (1982).
35. In this Comment the term "overcharge" refers to the illegal cost increases resulting from an
antitrust violation. See William H. Page, The Limits of State Indirect Purchaser Suits: Class
Certificationin the Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 Antitrust LJ.1, 10-11 (1999).
36. See Areeda & Hovenkamp, supranote 31, at 256-58; Kassis, supra note 34, at 1088 n.4, 7.
37. See Areeda & Hovenkamp, supranote 3 1, at 256-58; Kassis, supra note 34, at 1088 n.7.
38. See Areeda&Hovenkamp, supranote 31, at 256-58; Kassis,supra note 34, at 1088 n.4.
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In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.," the Court
granted standing to a direct purchaser although that party passed on the
entire overcharge to retailers and consumers. 40 Hanover, the plaintiff
shoe manufacturer, alleged that the defendant had unlawfully
monopolized the shoe machinery market, forcing manufacturers to lease
rather than buy the defendant's equipment.4' The defendant responded
that Hanover was not the proper plaintiff because Hanover had escaped
injury by passing on all alleged overcharges to retailers and consumers in
the form of higher shoe prices.42 The Court noted that regardless of any
subsequent pass on by the direct purchaser, such a party has paid more
for goods than it should have and thus may sue for treble damages.43 In
rejecting the defendant's pass-on argument, the Court held that direct
purchasers are not stripped of antitrust standing merely because they pay
for the overcharged item and then pass on the overcharge to a subsequent
purchaser.4
The Court's rejection of the defensive use of pass-on theory was based
on a number of concerns. The Court expressed worries that if it permitted
indirect purchasers to sue, those parties "would have only a tiny stake in
the lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action. ' 45 According to
the Court, this result would be unacceptable because the antitrust laws
would go underenforced and antitrust violators would thereby retain their
ill-gotten gains.' The Court also concluded that the potential difficulty of
proving the amount of passed-on overcharges was significant enough to
limit standing to parties that dealt directly with the antitrust violator.47
The Court thus rejected the use of defensive pass-on theory,48 but left
open the question of offensive pass-on theory.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

392 U.S. 481 (1968).
See id. at 487-88.
See id. at483.
See id. at 487-88.
See id.

44. See id. at 489 (noting that direct purchaser might increase prices in response to overcharge,
and injuries from resulting sales volume loss militate in favor of granting standing to direct
purchaser).
45. Id. at 494.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See supra note 34.

First Economic Injury Rule
In the wake of Hanover Shoe's pro-plaintiff rule, federal circuits
experienced a surge in private antitrust actions' and differed in their
application of the direct purchaser rule. By the mid-1970s, some courts
permitted plaintiffs that had not dealt directly with antitrust violators to
maintain section 4 actions, ° despite academic and judicial commentary
that granting plaintiffs exclusive use of the pass-on doctrine created an
asymmetry with Hanover Shoe,5 while other courts applied Hanover
barring both plaintiffs' and defendants' use of the
Shoe even-handedly,
52
pass-on theory.
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,3 the Court addressed the split among
the circuits and announced that basic equity demanded that the direct
purchaser rule apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants.' The plaintiffs,

the State of Illinois and several municipal government entities, sued a
group of concrete block manufacturers for illegally fixing and
maintaining prices."5 The plaintiffs had used defendants' products in

public construction projects, and claimed injury stemming from the
inclusion of the defendants' overpriced products in the general
construction bids. 6 Thus, even though the plaintiffs had not dealt directly
with the antitrust violators, they argued that they were directly injured

because the intermediary subcontractors had passed on all overcharges to
them.57 The Court rejected the plaintiffs' standing arguments based on
the Hanover Shoe holding.5"

49. See Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use ofthe Passing-OnDoctrine,46 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 98, 98 & n.1 (1972).
50. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1973)
(permitting state and local government entities to recover asphalt overcharges by subcontractors
included in final construction bids); West Virginia v. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir.
1971) (holding that state could use pass-on theory to recover on behalf of citizens because doctrine
was being used as attempt to award damages "to those who ultimately paid higher prices as a result
of the collusive pricing"); In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,680, at
94,980 (D. Conn. Aug. 23, 1973) ("[Hanover] should not be used to erect a legal barrier to
consumers who have managed to bring suit.").
51. See Note, Standingto Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use ofPassing-On, 123 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 976, 988-90 (1975); see also Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438
F.2d 1187, 1188 (3d Cir. 1971); Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 637 (D. Colo. 1971).
But see Note, supra note 49, at 111-14.
52. See, e.g., Mangano, 438 F.2d at 1188; Denver, 53 F.R.D. at 637 ("To try this case as a class
action might be an accountant's paradise, but it would be a court's purgatory.").
53. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
54. See ia at 729-31; see also Vincent A. Carrafiello, A Searchfor Symmetry: The "PassOn"
Issue in Quest ofDetermination,24 Antitrust Bull. 187, 192 (1979).
55. See IllinoisBrick, 431 U.S. at 726-27.
56. See id.
57. See id. at729-30.
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Four reasons led to the majority's rejection of offensive use of
passing-on theory.59 First, as in HanoverShoe, the direct-purchasers (the
subcontractors in Illinois Brick) had paid for the overcharged goods out
of their own coffers and only subsequently passed on the overcharge to
the plaintiffs.' Second, the risk of multiple liability for antitrust
defendants was too great and would make treble-damage actions
overwhelmingly complex if indirect purchasers and direct purchasers
could both sue for the same violations and claim the same damages.6
Third, the Court recognized that the problems of proof and
apportionment of damages that had troubled the Hanover Shoe Court
would also persist in a plaintiff's passing-on case.62 Finally, the Court
repeated its concerns from Hanover Shoe that permitting indirectly
injured parties to sue would lead to the ineffective enforcement of the
antitrust laws.63 Thus, the combined effect of the direct purchaser rule, as
announced in Hanover Shoe and expanded in Illinois Brick, was to ban
the use of the pass-on theory by both defendants and plaintiffs in private
antitrust suits.
B.

The Cost-Plus ContractException to the DirectPurchaserRule

To ensure that the antitrust laws do not go underenforced, the Court in
both Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick discussed in dicta an exception to
the direct purchaser rule, known as the "cost-plus contract exception,"
that would under limited circumstances grant standing to parties that had

58. See id. at 728-29.
59. See id. at 728. Whether this case presents a decision on standing is unclear. The Court noted
that "we do not address the standing issue, except to note ... that the question of which persons have
been injured by an illegal overcharge for purposes of § 4 is analytically distinct from the question of
which persons have sustained injuries too remote to give them standing to sue for damages under
§ 4." Id. at 728 n.7. This distinction may be too fine for practical purposes:
When [a "directness"] deficiency appears early in the case, courts often phrase the decision in
"standing" terms; otherwise, they tend to speak simply of a failure of proof. The name we give a
fatal deficiency in a plaintiff's suit does not matter, although "standing" is a convenient and
comprehensive term emphasizing this bundle of issues other than the presence of a violation or
an immunity.
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 31, at 259.
60. See IllinoisBrick, 431 U.S. at 726.
61. See id. at 730-31; see also Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1982).
62. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 731-32 (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481,493 (1968)).
63. See id. at 741.

First Economic Injury Rule
not dealt directly with the antitrust violator.' To qualify as a true costplus contract, and thus an exception to the direct purchaser rule, an
agreement between the direct and indirect purchasers must be negotiated
prior to ihe defendant's price-fixing activity and must specify both the
amount of the direct purchaser's markup and the quantity to be delivered
to the indirect purchaser.6 5 Under these narrow conditions, courts can
determine the indirect purchaser's injuries without relying on complex
economic analyses of market elasticity' and implicating problems of
efficient enforcement67 and multiple liability.68 Moreover, damages can
be easily measured because pursuant to the contract, the direct purchaser
automatically passes on all antitrust overcharges to the next party in
line.69 This exception did not apply in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe
because the plaintiffs negotiated contracts with subsequent purchasers
after the plaintiffs' dealings with the antitrust violator.7'
Courts differed in their application of the cost-plus contract exception.
71 the Fifth
For example, in In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation,
Circuit granted standing to a class of cattle ranchers to sue retail food
chains and grocers for allegedly conspiring to fix the price of beef
purchases from intermediary wholesalers, thus forcing the plaintiffs to
sell to the wholesalers at artificially depressed prices.72 The wholesalers
purchased the beef from plaintiffs and then sold it to defendants under a
strictly adhered-to cost-plus system.' Assuming the plaintiffs' allegations were true, the court found that the wholesalers' "habitual use of
predetermined formulae" for pricing in their purchases from the ranchers
amounted to the "functional equivalent of cost-plus contracts,"74 thus
64. See id, 431 U.S. at 736; Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494
(1968). This Comment will focus on the cost-plus contract exception, even though the Illinois Brick
Court also suggested a "control" exception, in which the direct purchaser is wholly owned and/or
controlled by the indirect purchaser. See lllinois Brick 431 U.S. at 736 n.16.
65. See Illinois BricIk 431 U.S. at 736; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 33, at 1720.
66. See IllinoisBrick,431 U.S. at 731-32, 736.
67. See a at 732 n.12.

68. Seeid at730.
at 736; HanoverShoe, 392 U.S. at 494.
69. See id.

70. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 743-46; HanoverShoe, 392 U.S. at 491-94.
71. 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979).

72. Seeid at 1154-55.
73. See id
74. Id at 1165. On remand, the court dismissed the ranchers' case because there was no proof of

the alleged rigid pricing system. See In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 710 F.2d 216, 219-20 (5th
Cir. 1983); see also In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1973)
("[S]tanding under § 4 of the Clayton Act is [not] limited exclusively to first-line purchasers unless
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insulating them from injury. Although these contracts did not predate the
antitrust violation and the plaintiffs never dealt directly with the
defendants, the court was unconcerned about calculating damages and
granted standing to the plaintiff ranchers."
Other courts interpreted the cost-plus exception less liberally. In
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,76 the plaintiff airline
sued a seller of aviation fuel for alleged overcharges on jet fuel." The
fuel seller asserted in defense that the airline was not the proper plaintiff
because the airline had passed on all overcharges to its passengersallegedly through a cost-plus arrangement.78 The court rejected the
defendant's cost-plus contract argument because the fare increases
occurred in response to increased gas prices and did not predate the
contracts between the airline and its passengers.79 The court noted thdt
although airline passengers may have absorbed some of the illegal
overcharge through increased fares, the airline was the proper plaintiff
because it suffered a significant economic injury before passing it on to
passengers.8" In finding no cost-plus arrangement, the court declined to
apply In re Beef Industry's more flexible "functional equivalent"
doctrine.8
In Kansas v. Utilicorp United Inc.,82 the U.S. Supreme Court applied
EasternAir Lines' rigid interpretation of the cost-plus contract exception.
A group of states on behalf of their residents claimed that the defendant
gas suppliers overcharged public gas utilities, which then passed on
100% of the overcharge to the residents.83 The Court held that the
there is a pre-existing cost-plus contract."); Obron v. Union Camp Corp., 477 F.2d 542, 543 (6th Cir.
1973) (finding that where plaintiff purchased goods from defendant and immediately resold to
consumers at cost plus five percent, this "drop-ship" method of distribution was "comparable to a
'pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract"'); Illinois v. Borg, 548 F. Supp. 972, 973 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("[T]he
facts of each relationship must be examined to see whether a cost-plus or equivalent arrangement
takes the transaction out of the IllinoisBrick rule ...
75. See In re BeefIndus., 600 F.2d at 1165.
76. 609 F.2d 497 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979).
77. See id. at 497.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 498.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 498-99 & n.1; supra note 74 and accompanying text; cf In re Plywood Antitrust
Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 639-41 (5th Cir. 1981) (distinguishing In re Beef Industry); Jewish Hosp.
Ass'n v. Stewart Mechanical Enters., 628 F.2d 971, 975-77 (6th Cir. 1980) (same); Mid-West Paper
Prod. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 577-78 (3d Cir. 1979) (rejecting cost-plus
argument).
82. 497 U.S. 199 (1990).
83. See id. at 217-18.

First Economic Injury Rule
contracts between consumers and the utilities did not qualify as cost-plus
contracts"4 because even in cases of 100% pass on, the exception85 does

not apply unless the pass on occurred under a pre-existing contract.

The Court justified its holdings on several grounds. Despite the nearly
complete pass on, the Court found that the overcharge injured the public
utilities because consumers were not bound by contracts that predated the
antitrust violation. 6 Because the utilities had paid for the overcharged
gas and then passed on its costs in the absence of fixed-quantity
contracts, the Court was convinced that if allowed to sue, consumers
would need to employ complex market-force analyses to determine
which party absorbed which part of the overcharge.87 Finally, the Court
noted the importance of the effective enforcement of federal antitrust
laws.88 The Court decided that public utilities had sufficient incentive to
sue, even though they likely passed on all overcharges.89 This enforcement policy was best served, the Court concluded, by granting standing
to the public utilities-the party with the resources necessary to

prosecute a massive antitrust action."
C.

The DirectInjury Requirement
In cases not implicating the direct purchaser rule and its cost-plus

contract exception, the U.S. Supreme Court has established a direct

It is beyond the scope of this Comment to address the Court's rejections of the states'
84. See id.
arguments that a specific exception to illinois Brick should be created for regulated public utilities,
and that the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1994), created an express cause of action for
indirectly injured parties. See Utilicorp,497 U.S. at 208-16, 219.
85. See Utilicorp,497 U.S. at 208-09.
86. See id. at 209. The Court also implicitly rejected the "functional equivalent" doctrine of In re
BeefIndustry: "Even if we were to create an exception for situations that merely resemble those
governed by [cost-plus] contract[s], we would not apply the exception here." Md at 218; see also
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 31, at 261-62.
87. See Utilicorp,497 U.S. at 218. The Court feared that these post-pass-on injuries would be too
difficult to apportion if consumers were allowed to sue. See id, at 209; see also Lee J. Potter, Kansas
and Missouri v. Utilicorp United, Inc.: The Supreme Court Applies the Illinois Brick Rule to
Regulated Utilities,69 N.C. L. Rev. 1041, 1046 (1991).
88. See Utilicorp, 497 U.S. at 214 (stating that "our interpretation of § 4 must promote the
vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws").
89. See id.; see also Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,494 (1968).
90. See Utilicorp, 497 U.S. at 215-17. ("Consumers may lack the expertise and experience
necessary for detecting improper pricing by a utility's suppliers.); see also Areeda & Hovenkamp,
supra note 31, at 262; Potter, supra note 87, at 1047 ("Even if [indirect purchasers] did discover
illegal behavior, the small individual amounts at stake probably would be insufficient to entice retail
customers into enduring the inconveniences of prolonged litigation.').

Washington Law Review

Vol. 75:549, 2000

injury teste9' as part of the broad proximate cause requirement. This
manifestation of the directness principle limits standing to plaintiffs with
injuries flowing directly from the antitrust violation.92
In Blue Shield v. McCready,93 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff may be directly injured even when it does not participate in the
discrete economic niche in which an antitrust violator operates. The
plaintiff, a Blue Shield health plan subscriber, alleged that her insurer
conspired with an organization of psychiatrists to deny reimbursement of
medical bills for all visits to psychologists.94 The plaintiff sued the
insurer and the psychiatrists' organization for her unreimbursed psychologist bills.95 She alleged that the insurer designed the conspiracy to
reduce the patronage of clinical psychologists, thereby increasing and
protecting the market share of higher-priced psychiatrists.96
Although the psychologists were the intended targets of the
defendants' conspiracy,97 the Court permitted McCready to sue because
her discrete losses (in the form of medical bills) eliminated the risk of
multiple liability: "McCready has paid her psychologist's bills; her injury
consists of Blue Shield's failure to pay her."9" The Court reasoned that
McCready's psychologist could make no claim of injury arising from his
treatment of her because plan subscribers like McCready were the only
parties "out of pocket as a consequence of the plan's failure to pay
benefits.""
91. Such a direct injury test has not been immune from criticism. For example, in Perkins v.
StandardOil Co., the Court stated:
[Any direct/indirect] limitation is wholly an artificial one and is completely unwarranted by the
language or purpose of the [price discrimination laws of the antitrust] Act... [Mhe competitive
harm done.., is certainly no less because of the presence of an additional link in this particular
distribution chain from the producer to the retailer.
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1969); see also In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 127 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Resurrecting notions of privity, this [directness] test
thus arbitrarily forecloses otherwise meritorious claims simply because another antitrust victim
interfaces the relationship between the claimant and the alleged violator.").
92. This rule is distinguishable from the direct purchaser rule in that it applies even in cases not
involving price fixing or the purchase of goods. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text; see
also International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
196 F.3d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 1999).
93.
94.
95.
96.

457 U.S. 465 (1982).
See id. at 467-68.
See id. at 468- 69.
See id. at 469 -70.

97. See id. at 478-79.
98. Id. at 475.
99. Id.
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In response to defendants' arguments that McCready's injuries were
too remote to grant standing because she was neither a target of the

alleged conspiracy,"° nor a participant in the economic market that had
allegedly been restrained,' °' the Court applied a broad directness
principle. McCready had standing simply because she was entitled to
contractual benefits that had not been reimbursed. 2 Thus, although she

neither participated in the market for group health plans nor was a target
of the conspiracy,0 3 her injury satisfied the direct injury requirement
because it was "within the area of the economy" endangered by the
defendants' antitrust violations."e4

The most recent and thorough discussion of the direct injury requirement occurred one year later in Associated General Contractors v.
California State Council of Carpenters. 5 In that case, the Court

enumerated and explained the factors it would employ in all antitrust
standing analyses and ruled that it would award standing only to

plaintiffs whose injuries flowed directly from the antitrust violation. 6 In
Associated General Contractors,the two plaintiff labor unions alleged
that an association of building contractors had coerced several general
contractors into dealing only with non-unionized subcontractors.'0 7
Unionized subcontractors, in turn, allegedly lost contracts and turned to
non-union labor themselves.' The plaintiffs alleged that the contractors'

100. See idat 478-79.
101. SeeitL at479-80.
102. Seeid at480.
103. See id at 479 ("[R]emedy cannot reasonably be restricted to those competitors whom the
conspirators hoped to eliminate from the market").
104. Iad
(citing Inre Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir. 1973)). This
"area of the economy" test led some courts to rely on "the defendant's 'aim,' objective, or intention
and to think of the target area as a zone covering those [injuries] within the intended or foreseeable
effects of the defendant's violation." Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 31, at 236.
105. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
106. This Comment discusses only the direct injury test announced in Associated General
Contractors.See id. at 540-43. However, the Court also set forth at least three other distinct tests.
First, it required some causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the plaintiff's
injury, as defined by traditional notions of proximate cause. See id. at 537. Second, the Court's
"antitrust injury" analysis required that the plaintiff establish that the injury be of the type that the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent See idt at 538-40; see also infra note 184. Finally, the Court
noted that the plaintiff's alleged damages must not be "speculative." Associated General
Contractors,459 U.S. at 542-43; see also American Ad Management, Inc. v. General Tel. Co., 190
F.3d 1051, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 1999) (listing and applying Associated GeneralContractorsfactors);
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 31, at 194-96.
107. See AssociatedGeneral Contractors,459 U.S. at 520-21.
108. See idt; see also Areeda & Hovenkamp, supranote 3 1,at 196-97.
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association was to blame for this diversion of work away from labor
unions like themselves. 10 9
After noting that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to
"encompass every conceivable harm that can be traced to alleged
wrongdoing,"" the Court announced that one criterion for denying
'
standing was "the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury."'
Without clearly defining directness, the Court held that the Associated
General Contractors plaintiffs' injury was insufficiently direct for
standing."' Of primary importance to the Court was the existence of a
more directly injured party:' ' if any injury resulted from the defendants'
coercive practices, the unionized contractors and subcontractors (against
whom the coercion was directed) felt such injuries more directly than the
4
unions. "'
Il. THE HEALTH CARE TRUST FUND CASES
Private tobacco litigation has been one of the more prominent contexts
in which the antitrust directness standing requirements have recently
arisen. Over the last four years, classes of union health care trust funds'"'
in several states have sued the major tobacco companies" 6 to recover the
costs incurred in treating nicotine-addicted beneficiaries." 7
109. See AssociatedGeneral Contractors,459 U.S. at 520-21.
110. Id. at 536.
111. Id. at 540.
112. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
113. As in prior antitrust cases, the Court also cited policies including conservation of judicial
resources, avoiding excessively complex actions, and ensuring that the antitrust laws were enforced.
See Associated General Contractors,459 U.S. at 544-45.
114. See id. at 542 & n.47; see also Service Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 70, 86 (D.D.C. 1999) ("[T]he Supreme Court has never ruled that
a plaintiff's injuries are too remote without first identifying a plaintiff who was more directly
injured ....
").
115. In this Comment, "trusts" and "trust funds" refer to all plaintiffs in the trust fund cases
unless otherwise indicated. See, e.g., Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 771, 777 (N.D. Ohio 1998) ("The plaintiffs are nonprofit, union-sponsored taxexempt trusts organized under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act . . . . The trusts
provide medical or hospital care benefits to participants and their beneficiaries as an employee
retirement income security program."); Texas Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
21 F. Supp. 2d 664, 666 (E.D. Tex. 1998), aff'd, 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000) ("The Funds are
financed by withholding employee wages at amounts negotiated through collective bargaining ...
[and] administered by a board of trustees, drawn equally from representatives of both labor and
management."). See generally 27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship §§ 77-82 (1996).
116. The major tobacco companies, commonly known as "The Big Six," include: Philip Morris,
Inc.; RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.; Lorillard Tobacco Co.;
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The trust funds patterned their substantive antitrust claim on the
nationwide suit filed by the states' attorneys general." ' The trust fund
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant tobacco companies engaged in a
conspiracy to deceive the public and health care providers, such as the
trust funds, by misrepresenting the addictiveness of nicotine and
suppressing the development of safer cigarettes." 9 More specifically, the

trust funds alleged that this industry-wide agreement constituted "quality
fixing" by the industry-a collusive agreement to manipulate the

nicotine content of tobacco products to 20 ensure addiction and avoid
competition on the basis of relative safety.

Liggett & Myers, Inc.; and American Tobacco Co., Inc. See NY Becomes the 20th State to Sue Big
Sis Tobacco Companies,Associated Press, Jan. 27, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 4853609.
117. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 1999); Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 799 (2000); Oregon LaborersEmployers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 789 (2000); Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 912 (2000); Service Employees, 83
F. Supp. 2d 70; Arkansas Carpenters' Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d
936 (E.D. Ark. 1999); Rhode Island Laborers' Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 97500L, 1999 WL 619064 (D.R.L Aug. 11, 1999) (report and recommendation on defendants' motions
to dismiss); Northwest Laborers-Employers Health & See. Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 58 F.
Supp. 2d 1211 (W.D. Wash. 1999); Hawaii Health & Welfare Trust Fund for Operating Eng'rs v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Haw. 1999); Laborers' & Operating Eng'rs' Util.
Agreement Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 943 (D. Ariz. 1999);
Seafarers Welfare Plan v. Philip Morris, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 623 (D. Md. 1998); Kentucky Laborers
Dist. Council Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Hill & Knowlton, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 755 (W.D. Ky.
1998); Iron Workers, 23 F. Supp. 2d 771; Texas Carpenters, 21 F. Supp. 2d 664; New Jersey
Carpenters Health Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 324 (D.N.J. 1998); Stationary Eng'rs
Local 39 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 1998-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 72,167
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 1998); Southeast Fla. Laborers Dist. Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 1998-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,163 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 1998).
118. See InternationalBhd of Teamsters, 196 F-3d at 820-21; Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 918.
Most of the attorney general cases were brought in state court because they involved state antitrust
and consumer protection claims as well as federal antitrust claims. See generally Texas v. American
Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (ED. Tex. 1997); State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 1JU-97-915CI
(Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 1998) (memorandum and order on defendants' motions to dismiss); State
v. American Tobacco, Co., No. CV 96-14769 (Ariz. Super. Ct. May 27, 1997) (order on defendants'
third joint motion to dismiss); State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. CDV-97-306 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Sept.
22, 1998) (memorandum and order on defendants' motions to dismiss); State v. American Tobacco
Co., No. 96-2-15056-8, 1996 WL 931316 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1996) (order on defendants'
joint motion to dismiss); State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 97-CV-328 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 17, 1998)
(decision and order on defendants' motion to dismiss). Other health care payor entities similar to the
trust funds also attempted cost recovery actions. See, e.g., Regence Blueshield v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
40 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (W.D. Wash. 1999); State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996)
(involving joint suit by the State of Minnesota and Blue Shield).
119. See, e.g., LaborersLocal 17, 191 F.3d at 232-33; Oregon Laborers, 185 F.3d at 961.
120. See, e.g., Oregon Laborers, 185 F.3d at 961-62; Texas Carpenters,21 F. Supp. 2d at 666.
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As their primary antitrust standing argument, the trust funds alleged

that they were the directly injured party, at least in terms of economic
loss. The trusts claimed to have "borne the [economic] brunt of smokingrelated health care costs" and sought to replenish their coffers by
recovering for expenditures that they made as a result of the defendants'
misconduct.' The trusts acknowledged that their beneficiaries (the
smokers themselves) had suffered personal injuries flowing from the
defendants' misconduct. 22 Nonetheless, the trusts maintained that the
economic injury flowed directly to them because they were contractually
obligated to pay the beneficiaries' health care costs."
In their attempts to apply the U.S. Supreme Court's directness tests
consistently, federal courts generally refused to accept the trust funds'
standing arguments.12' Led by the Third Circuit in Steamfitters Local
Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 25 many courts found
that the trust fund plaintiffs were "too remote" to recover for any
damages sustained as a result of the alleged conspiracy. 26 The courts
reasoned that the trusts' antitrust injuries were entirely derivative of

121. Oregon Laborers, 185 F.3d at 962.
122. See Service Employees, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 75-78 (detailing trust funds' allegations about
health problems associated with smoking).
123. See id.; Northwest Laborers, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 1213. As an alternative theory, the plaintiffs
in Northwest Laborers posited that their health care contracts with beneficiaries qualified as costplus contracts because the funds were contractually obligated to pay for all nicotine-related health
care costs. The court summarily rejected this theory, holding that "the exception for cost-plus
contracts.., is inapplicable." See id. at 1216.
124. This Comment will focus on the courts' rejection of the trust funds' claims based on
"directness" (or other like terminology, such as "remoteness" or "derivativeness"). See. e.g.,
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196
F.3d 818, 823-25 (7th Cir. 1999); Rhode Island Laborers' Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., No. 97-500L, 1999 WL 619064, at *2 (D.R.I. Aug. 11, 1999) (listing federal courts that have
granted and denied standing to plaintiff trust funds); Laborers' & Operating Eng'rs' Util. Agreement
Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 943, 950 (D. Ariz. 1999);
Seafarers Welfare Plan v. Philip Morris, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (D. Md. 1998). Besides the
directness issue, courts found that the trusts had not sustained an injury to business or property, see,
e.g., Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 926 n.8
(3d Cir. 1999), and had not participated in the relevant market, see, e.g., Oregon Laborers, 185 F.3d
at 966-67. These additional standing requirements are beyond the scope of this Comment. But see
generallyAreeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 31.
125. 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999).
126. See, e.g., InternationalBhd. of Teamsters, 196 F.3d at 823; Laborers Local 17 Health &
Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 238-40 (2d Cir. 1999); Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at
921; Hawaii Health & Welfare Trust Fund for Operating Eng'rs v. Philip Morris, Inc., 52 F. Supp.
2d 1196, 1198-200 (D. Haw. 1999).
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personal injuries suffered by the smokers." Overall, the Courts of
Appeal that confronted the issue concluded that there was no direct link
between the defendants' alleged misconduct and the plaintiffs' alleged

injuries.1

m. THE FIRST ECONOMIC INJURY RULE IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE DIRECTNESS STANDING DOCTRINES
Taken together, the direct purchaser rule, its cost-plus contract
exception, and the direct injury requirement describe a particular type of
private antitrust plaintiff to whom courts have consistently granted
standing: the party with the first economic injury, regardless of that
party's position in the chain of causation. Courts should acknowledge
that this common theme unites the existing directness tests and should
clarify federal antitrust jurisprudence by explicitly adopting a first
economic injury rule. This first economic injury rule is consistent with
each of the major policy concerns that underlie existing antitrust
directness requirements.
The first economic injury rule is easily explained: the party in the
causal chain to suffer the first economic effects of an antitrust violation
has standing to sue; all subsequently harmed parties are denied standing
even when the entire overcharge is subsequently passed on to them. In
other words, the courts should grant standing to the first party injured as
a result of the antitrust violation. As illustrated below in Table 1, the first
economic injury rule is consistent with the courts' grant of standing in a
variety of antitrust contexts.

127. See, e.g., Oregon Laborers, 185 F.3d at 964 (finding that although smokers could raise
antitrust claims, lack of suitable plaintiff did not "necessarily lead to the conclusion that [the trust
funds] must therefore have standing"); see also Stationary Eng'rs Local 39 Health & Welfare Trust
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 1998-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,167, at 82,077-79 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30,

1998).
128. InternationalBhd. of Teamsters, 196 F.3d at 823-25; Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 239;

Oregon Laborers, 185 F.3d at 964-65; Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 927-28. But see Service
Employees, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 86; Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
23 F. Supp. 2d 771, 793 (N.D. Ohio 1998) ("[IThe Court finds no more directly injured victims who
could bring antitrust claims, first, because the antitrust laws do not allow an action for personal
injury [thus excluding smokers], and second, because plaintiffs-funds are better positioned to make
such claims.").
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TABLE 1
CASE

Hanover
Shoe
Illinois Brick
Utilicorp

ALLEGED
ANTITRUST
VIOLATOR(S)
Shoe Machine
Manufacturer
Brick
Manufacturers
Gas Suppliers

________

Eastern Air
Lines
Associated
General
Contractors
McCready

Gas Co.
Contractors'
Association

Blue Shield &
Psychiatrists
In re Beef
Retail Beef
Industry
Purchasers
Trust Funds
Tobacco
Companies
*
Indicates parties that would
rule, assuming other standing

[]
A.

FIRST PARTY(S)

Shoe
Tuanfacturer.,
Subcontractors*
TIublic Gas,
Ttlltles*
Airline*
General Contractors

SECOND
PARTY(S)

THIRD
PARTY(S)

Retailers

Customers

General
Contractors
Gas Customers

State Plaintiffs

Passengers

-

'Unionized
Subcontractors*

-

Plaintiff
Unions

Employer (Health
Health-lan.
Psychologists
Plan Purchaser)
Member *",
Wholesale Beef
Ranchers and
Purchasers
Stockyardsor
Smoker
Trust Funds*
-Beneficiaries
be granted antitrust standing under the first economic injury
requirements are met.

Indicates parties that were granted standing.

The FirstEconomic Injury Rule Is Consistent with the Direct
PurchaserRule

The first economic injury rule is consistent with the direct purchaser
rule developed in Hanover Shoe and IllinoisBrick. 29 Although the Court
gave different reasons for its standing rulings in both cases,'30 it granted
standing to the party with the first economic injury. In Hanover, although
the shoe manufacturer plaintiff may have passed on a portion of the
overcharge to retailers and consumers,' it suffered the first loss as a
result of the defendant's monopolistic practices. Similarly, it was the
concrete subcontractors in Illinois Brick who actually purchased the
overcharged concrete from the defendants.'32 The Court correctly denied
standing to the government entity plaintiffs because the subcontractors'
status as the first economically injured party did not change when the
subcontractors included these costs in their construction bids. In both

129.
130.
131.
132.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra notes 46-47, 59-63, and accompanying text
See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1968).
See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,726 (1977).
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cases, the Court's grant of standing is consistent with the first economic
injury rule.
Permitting only the party with the first economic injury to sueregardless of whether or not the party dealt directly with the antitrust
violator-also achieves the policy goals of both Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick.'3 3 These policy concerns include the risk ,of multiple
liability, the efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the complex
apportionment of damages among injured parties. Indeed, proving how
much of the overcharge the Illinois Brick subcontractors (the parties with
the first economic injury) eventually passed on would have been
exceedingly difficult. "
B.

The Direct-Purchaser/Cost-PlusContractException Dichotomy Is
UnnecessaryBecause Both Doctrines Operate Together to Support
the FirstEconomic Injury Rule

The direct-purchaser and cost-plus contract doctrines both award
standing to the party with the first economic injury. Accordingly, the
latter is best described not as an exception to the direct purchaser rule,
but as evidence that the direct purchaser rule is only one component of
the first economic injury rule. Under Illinois Brick, the cost-plus contract
doctrine illustrates that the injured party under section 4 of the Clayton
Act 3 ---and thus the party with standing-is the party with the first
economic injury. When the indirect party agrees to accept whatever
overcharges may appear through the cost-plus contract, it incurs the first
economic injury and thus has standing regardless of its position in the
' Although
causal chain. 36
the direct purchaser is in privity with the
antitrust violator, it is insulated from harm by the automatic pass-on
contained in a cost-plus contract."3 ' By not requiring that the plaintiff be
in privity with the antitrust violator, 3 ' the cost-plus contract doctrine
indicates that the identification of the party with the first economic injury

133. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
134. See Illinois Brick,431 U.S. at 742-43.
135. See supranotes 26-27 and accompanying text
136. See supraTable 1.
137. See supranotes 64-70 and accompanying text.
138. In fact, there has never been any privity requirement in antitrust law, and courts have
expressly declined to apply such a requirement. See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642,
648 (1969); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Privity is not
required in antitrust cases."); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 127 (9th Cir.
1973).
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is at the heart of the Court's directness standing jurisprudence. Thus,
when the Court rules that the direct purchaser alone may sue-unless
that purchaser is insulated from economic injury by a cost-plus
contract-dividing such a holding into two distinct doctrines is
unnecessary.
The interpretation of the cost-plus contract exception as a component
of the first economic injury rule satisfies the policy objectives of Illinois
Brick on two levels. First, there is no difficulty in apportioning damages
between direct and indirect purchasers when the direct purchaser is
contractually obligated to pass on 100% of the overcharge to the indirect
purchaser.'39 Second, permitting indirect purchasers to sue under costplus contracts does not threaten to diminish the effective enforcement of
the antitrust laws because the party that has incurred the first economic
injury will be the most highly motivated to sue. 4
In re Beef Industry and EasternAir Lines also illustrate that the directpurchaser and cost-plus contract doctrines are both components of the
first economic injury rule and operate together to support the rule.' In
In re Beef Industry, the court reasoned that the parties with the first and
only economic injury were the cattle ranchers. 4 The intermediaries that
dealt directly with the alleged conspirators were not the appropriate
plaintiffs because they were insulated by their cost-plus arrangements
with the ranchers.'4 3 Thus, the intermediaries suffered no economic
injury. Similarly, the court in Eastern Air Lines permitted the airline to
sue, despite its having passed on much of the overcharge to its

139. See Illinois Brick 431 U.S. at 736; Hovenkamp, supra note 33, at 1723; see also Joseph H.
Andersen, A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Cost-Plus Contract Exception in Hanover Shoe
and Illinois Brick, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 743, 752-53 (1980) ("The [cost-plus] contract thus
'circumvent[s] complex market interactions' of supply and demand that normally make it impossible
to trace the effects of an overcharge. The contract makes it 'easy to prove' that the direct purchaser
did not absorb any of the overcharge and hence was not damaged.") (footnotes omitted); cf In re
Western Liquid, 487 F.2d at 197-99 (permitting parties like dismissed plaintiffs in Illinois Brick to
sue, despite fact that direct purchasers had passed on overcharge through variety of cost-plus
arrangements that did not technically qualify as cost-plus contracts).
140. See, e.g., Elmer J. Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 883, 917 (1975) (explaining how cost-plus
contract doctrine preserves vitality of private antitrust actions); cf Thomas W. Dunfee, Privity in
Antitrust: Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 16 Am. Bus. L.J. 107, 114 (1978) (noting that indirect purchasers
,are much more likely to sue than direct purchasers when latter's losses are passed on under cost-plus
contract).
141. See supranotes 71-74, 76-80, and accompanying text.
142. See In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1165 (5th Cir. 1979).
143. See id.
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passengers through increased fares,'" because the potentially enormous
loss in fuel costs was the first economic impact of the overcharge. The
cases' varying liberal and conservative applications of the cost-plus
contract doctrine'45 do not undermine their support of that doctrine as a
part of the first economic injury rule.
Finally, the Utilicorp' Court's affirmation of the cost-plus contract
exception in the context of its application of the direct purchaser rule
further demonstrates that the direct purchaser rule/cost-plus contract
dichotomy is unnecessary. Because the public utilities had paid an
artificially inflated price for the gas before passing on their costs to
consumers under variable quantity contracts,147 the Court refused to find
a cost-plus contract.'48 However, the five-justice majority explicitly
affirmed the continuing vitality of the cost-plus exception. 4 9 Citing
Illinois Brick's and Hanover Shoe's discussions of the cost-plus contract
exception, the Court indicated that the direct purchaser rule would apply
unless the direct purchaser bears no portion of the overcharge and
otherwise suffers no injury." 0 Thus, the direct purchaser rule applies only
when the direct purchaser suffers the first economic injury flowing from
the antitrust violation. If the direct purchaser escapes unscathed from its
dealings with the antitrust violator, the cost-plus contract exception may
step in to award standing to the next injured purchaser in the causal
chain. This uneven rule/exception landscape is leveled by the simpler
first economic injury rule.
C.

The FirstEconomic Injury Rule Is Consistentwith the DirectInjury
Requirement

The U.S. Supreme Court's discussion and application of the direct
injury requirement in both McCready and Associated General
Contractors should be understood as advancing a single underlying
principle: the party who suffers the first economic effects of an antitrust
violation has standing, assuming other standing requirements are met.1'5
144. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 609 F.2d 497, 498 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1979).
145. See supra notes 74-75,81, and accompanying text.
146. 497 U.S. 199 (1990).

147.
148.
149.
150.

See id. at 209.
See id at218.
See id; supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
See Utilicorp,497 U.S. at 218.

151. See supranote 106.
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Although McCready was not the target of the conspiracy between Blue
Shield and the psychiatrists, 152 the Court granted standing because Blue
Shield's failure to pay her psychologist's bills'53 constituted the first
economic injury. The alleged conspiracy could have reduced the market
share of psychologists by diverting plan members like McCready
towards psychiatrists, 5 4 but this injury would have followed her
economic loss.' Similarly, in Associated General Contractors any
injury that the plaintiff unions suffered would have been secondary to
that of the unionized subcontractors who supposedly lost bids because
they used union employees.' 56 Therefore, as illustrated in Table 1, the
unionized subcontractors were the only party in Associated General
Contractorsthat could have suffered the first economic injury.
The first economic injury rule also advances the primary policy
concerns of the McCready and Associated General ContractorsCourts.
The McCready Court's chief policy concerns were preventing double
damage recovery157 and providing relief to victims of antitrust
violations.' These policy goals and the test the Court used require that a
plaintiff demonstrate that it suffered the first economic injury. McCready
was the only party that had suffered an economic injury that could be
"ascertained to the penny."' 5 9 This injury was the first detrimental
economic effect of the conspiracy. As for the Associated General
Contractors Court's concerns, granting standing to plaintiffs who suffer
the first concrete economic injury resulting from an antitrust violation
ensures that antitrust actions in district courts will proceed as simply and
manageably as possible. 1"e Further, because only one injured party may
sue, courts will not have to apportion damages or face duplicative
claims. 6 ' Finally, the first economic injury rule encourages the enforcement of the antitrust laws by providing would-be plaintiffs with a simple

152. See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 480 (1982).
153. See id. at 475.
154. See id.
155. See supra Table 1.
156. See Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 541-42 (1983) ("If either these [contractor] firms, or the immediate victims of coercion by
defendants, have been injured by an antitrust violation, their injuries would be direct and, as we held
in McCready... they would have a right to maintain their own treble-damage actions ....
").
157. See McCready, 457 U.S. at 475.
158. See id. at 472.
159. Id. at475 n.l1.
160. See Associated GeneralContractors,459 U.S. at 544-45.
161. See id.
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and predictable directness test. Despite the different terminology and
policies the Court advanced to support its holdings, a single class of
plaintiffs-those who experience the first economic impacts of the
antitrust violation-qualifies for standing under the tests employed by
both McCready and Associated GeneralContractors.
In sum, the Supreme Court's major antitrust standing precedents to
date-Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, McCready, Associated General
Contractors, and Utilicorp-have used different tests to analyze the
directness of an antitrust plaintiff's injury in a variety of factual contexts.
The common theme that emerges is the grant of antitrust standing to tlie
party that incurs the first significant economic injury.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST ECONOMIC INJURY RULE
DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TRUST FUNDS WERE
DIRECTLY INJURED
Under the first economic injury rule, the tobacco companies'
conspiracy directly injured the union health care trust funds. Instead of
recognizing that the application of any directness standing principle
depends on whether the plaintiff suffered the first economic injury, the
tobacco decisions essentially applied an artificial privity requirement 62
unsupported by precedent. In so doing, the courts misapplied both the
first economic injury rule and the antitrust standing precedent on which it
is based. Although the courts may have appropriately denied standing to
the trust funds based on other factors, they erred in holding that the trust
funds were not directly injured.
A.

The Trust Funds Satisfied the FirstEconomic Injury Test

The trust funds pass muster under the first economic injury test as it
applied in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. Assuming the tobacco
companies' alleged antitrust violations caused an economic injury,6 the
first economic impact of their antitrust violation was the costs that the
trust funds were contractually obligated to pay on behalf of their
smoking beneficiaries. In both Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, the
Court granted standing to the party who suffered the first economic
162. See supra note 138.
163. The courts did not enter any findings of fact on this issue in the trust fund cases. This
Comment assumes that the trust funds could establish such a causal connection. It is critical to
recognize that this "causal connection" analysis is distinct from directness of injury. See Associated
General Contractors,459 U.S. 519, 537, 540-42 (applying each test separately).
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injury."6 Similarly, the physically injured smokers did not bear the

financial costs of medical care for their nicotine addiction because of
their contracts with the health care trust funds.'65 Accordingly, no party
in the causal chain was economically injured due to the tobacco
companies' alleged misconduct before the trust funds' expenditures.
Thus, under a first economic injury analysis, the trust funds are the
proper plaintiffs, at least with regard to directness."es
The trust funds' directness argument also finds support in the first
economic injury rule, as it would apply in both In re Beef Industry 67 and
Eastern Air Lines. 68 In keeping with the rulings in those cases, 169 each
individual health care contract in the trust fund cases was negotiated
before the beneficiary suffered any nicotine-related injuries, and those
contracts explicitly allocated costs, prevented any difficulty in allocating
damages, and eliminated problems in proving if and how much of the
costs of an antitrust violation each party absorbed. 7 ' Under a first
economic injury analysis, the courts' rulings ignored the nature of the
contractual relationship between the smokers and the trust funds.
Although the trust funds never purchased anything from their
beneficiaries or the defendants 17' and were not in privity with the
antitrust violator,'72 the trust funds' contractual obligations ensured that
no smoker would bear the medical costs of treating nicotine addiction
and related health problems. 73 Moreover, in keeping with the policy
164. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
165. It would be disingenuous to claim that diseases related to nicotine addiction do not
economically impact smokers as well. The smokers themselves suffer, among many other things,
lost wages, decreased life span, and loss of consortium with loved ones. See, e.g., International Bhd.
of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818, 824 (7th
Cir. 1999). This Comment purports only to deal with the actual health care expenditures paid for
under the pre-existing contracts between the smoker beneficiaries and the trust funds.
166. Again, it is beyond the scope of this Comment to analyze whether the courts properly denied
standing to the trust funds on other grounds. The first economic injury rule demonstrates only that
they should not have been denied standing on the basis of directness.
167. 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979).
168. 609 F.2d 497 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979).
169. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
171. As demonstrated by the facts of Associated General Contractors, there is no requirement
that the plaintiff actually purchase anything from any other party. See supra notes 107-09 and
accompanying text; see also supra note 138.
172. See supra note 138; see also supra Table 1.
173. This argument assumes that the trust funds could establish a causal connection between the
defendants' malfeasance, the smokers' addictions, the related injuries, and the funds' subsequent
expenditures. The difficulties in proving such a connection lie beyond the scope of this Comment.
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considerations of EasternAir Lines and Utilicorp, the party with the first
economic injury (the trust funds in this case) is the party best equipped to
prosecute a massive private action and ensure that the antitrust laws are
enforced effectively. 4
B.

The CourtsMisappliedAntitrust StandingPrecedentandRan Afoul
of the FirstEconomic Injury Rule by Ruling that the Trust Funds
Were Not Directly Injured

The trust funds also satisfy the direct injury rule and first economic
injury rule as it would apply in McCready75 and Associated General
Contractors.76 Like the plaintiff in McCready, the trust funds made
expenditures that were triggered by the upstream parties' inability to
purchase a product untainted by conspiracy. Just as the psychologists
could not sue in McCready because the patient had incurred the first
economic injury,177 the smokers in the trust fund cases never paid f'or
their medical treatment resulting from nicotine addiction. 178 The
McCready Court emphasized that granting standing to the plan
participant did not implicate the apportionment and complexity concerns
of Illinois Brick because the health care plan fixed her damages and
' 79
permitted the courts to ascertain those damages "to the penny.'
Similarly, the health care plans used by the trust funds would permit
courts to pinpoint, with McCready-like certainty, the expenses related to
nicotine addiction. 8 °

174. Two circuits expressly noted that smokers themselves would or could not bring an action
against the tobacco companies under the federal antitrust laws. See Oregon Laborers-Employers
Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 1999); Steamnfitters
Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912,927 (3d Cir. 1999).
175. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
176. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
177. See McCready, 457 U.S. at472 & 475 n.1 1; supranotes 152-54 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 165.
179. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
180. Cf Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995).
Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Posner explained, "Blue Cross paid Marshfield Clinic directly,
in accordance with Blue Cross's contractual obligations to its insureds, and if it paid too much
because the Clinic violated the antitrust laws then it ought to be allowed to sue to recover these
damages." Id. at 1414-15. Unlike the trust fund cases, Marshfield involved the payment of health
care expenses directly to the antitrust violator. See id. at 1408-09. Nonetheless, the case
demonstrates that plaintiffs can recover health care expenses induced by antitrust violations. But see
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196
F.3d 818, 826-27 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that Marshfieldhas no application to trust funds).
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The McCready holding indicates that courts should grant standing to
the party with the first economic injury, regardless of whether that party
is the precise target of the defendants' conspiracy. 8 ' Despite this
mandate, the trust fund courts failed to recognize that the trust funds
were directly injured even though the actual targets of the tobacco
companies' conspiracy may have been smokers. 2 For example, the
Third Circuit distinguished McCready by finding that, unlike the plaintiff
in McCready, the trust funds did not participate in the market affected by
the alleged antitrust violations.'83 Although this holding demonstrates
that the trust funds' injuries may not have been of the type that the
antitrust laws intend to prevent,"s it does not address or call into question
whether or not the funds suffered the first economic injury."',
The trust funds' standing arguments also find support in the
Associated General Contractors decision, in that no more directly
economically injured parties are interposed between the trust funds and
the antitrust violators.'86 In both Associated General Contractorsand the
trust fund cases, the proper plaintiff absorbed the economic injury
despite the presence of an intermediary party that may have known of the
alleged conspiracy."' The proper plaintiffs also occupied a downstream
position in the causal chain and did not purchase anything from the
antitrust violator.'88 In light of a first economic injury rule that satisfies
each of the policy concerns of the Associated General Contractors
Court189 and the similarity between the causal chains in both cases, the
courts erred in declaring the trust funds too remote to sue and recover
damages.
181. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
183. Stearnfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 922-23
(3d Cir. 1999).
184. This "antitrust injury" analysis is analytically distinct from the directness requirements at
issue in this Comment. Although "the tests for antitrust injury and for reasonable proximity are not
entirely separable, . . . clear thinking" about antitrust standing requires addressing directness and
antitrust injury analyses separately. Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 31, at 237; see also
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,489 (1977).
185. Cf. Oregon Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185
F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that smokers could not sue in antitrust, thereby implicitly
acknowledging that there is no more directly economically injured plaintiff than trust funds for
purposes of antitrust standing).
186. See Service Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 83
F. Supp. 2d 70, 86-87 (D.D.C. 1999).
187. See supra notes 121-23, 156.
188. See supra notes 107-09, 121-23.
189. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
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The Steamfitters holding that the trust funds' injuries were indirect
under the Associated General Contractorstest' 9° misapplied that Court's
construction of private antitrust standing requirements. After the Court
noted that "more directly injured parties existed in [Associated General
Contractors, but] this is not necessarily the case here,"' 9' the Third
Circuit improperly coupled this assertion with a discussion of the causal
connection between the defendants' alleged misconduct and the trust
funds' injuries."9 This analysis incorrectly conflated two distinct tests
from Associated General Contractors;93 the Associated General
Contractors Court expressly noted that the "causal connection" and
"directness of injury" factors are distinct parts of the general proximate
cause analysis."9 Thus, the Steamfitters court disregarded traditional
directness analysis and its simpler manifestation-the first economic

injury rule.
In sum, the reasons that the courts misapplied antitrust standing
precedent and the first economic injury rule when they denied standing
to the trust funds are twofold. First, like the proper antitrust plaintiff in
each of the major antitrust standing cases, the trust funds suffered the
first economic injury resulting from the alleged antitrust violationregardless of their position in the causal chain or their lack of privity
with the antitrust violator. Second, a factual comparison of the causal
chains in the major antitrust standing precedents' demonstrates that the
nature of the trust funds' claims did not differ materially from those in
the precedents.
V.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court's unwillingness to define directness more
clearly as it applies to antitrust standing has left the federal judiciary illequipped to evaluate new approaches to private antitrust enforcement by
plaintiffs like the trust funds. While the current mixed bag of directness
tests applied by federal courts permits a case-by-case analysis of private
plaintiffs' claims, it also fosters the type of misapplication that plagued
190. See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912,
927-28 (3d Cir. 1999).
191. See i. at 927. The Steamfitters court also found that the trust funds claims presented no
danger of multiple liability or difficult damage apportionment. See id.at 928-29.
192. See id at 927-28.
193. 459 U.. 519,537,540-42 (1983); supra note 163.
194. See Associated GeneralContractors,459 U.S. at 537, 540-42.
195. See supraTable 1.
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the trust fund decisions. The courts may have properly denied standing to
the trust funds on other grounds, but it is demonstrative of the confusion
over standing and directness that nearly every court facing the issue ruled
that the trust funds were not directly injured for purposes of antitrust
standing. Antitrust law is, by its nature, focused on the economic effects
of an antitrust violation. At least with regard to directness, these trust
fund decisions contravened antitrust standing precedent by employing a
disfavored privity requirement rather than conventional directness
analysis.
Insofar as the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to address this issue in
the context of the trust fund decisions, the matter awaits resolution for
another day. When presented with another opportunity, the Court should
reevaluate the descriptions and practical effects of its antitrust standing
doctrine, particularly its directness principles. A more predictable and
easily applicable directness test would engender greater consistency of
results in the district and circuit courts without infringing on the multifactor analysis espoused by the Court in Associated General Contractors.
Adoption of the first economic injury rule in place of current directness
tests would better capture the sum and substance of the Court's antitrust
standing jurisprudence by ensuring both the consistent and predictable
application of its directness principles and the effective and efficient
enforcement of federal antitrust laws.

